Published 15th September 2026

Immigration splits America, rallies Republicans and fires up Democrats

Immigration splits America, rallies Republicans and fires up Democrats

Last month the Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse found the Trump administration’s tariffs mobilizing the President’s opponents at nearly twice the rate of his supporters. This month the poll tested the Republicans’ signature issue: immigration.

  • Immigration mobilizes Republicans to turn out to vote, in a way that tariffs do not.
  • Immigration mobilizes Democrats with even greater intensity, turning out to vote against the policies.
  • Immigration does not win the middle. Across all Americans, a candidate who supports Trump’s immigration policies sees a net negative of -6 points.
  • Immigration splits high turn out voters, like the over-65s, households with high incomes, and college graduates.

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse – a nationally representative poll delivered by YouGov – asked Americans whether the Trump administration’s immigration policies have made them more or less likely to do each of the following, or made no difference:

  • “Vote in the November 2026 midterm elections.”
  • “Vote for a candidate from a different political party than the presidential candidate you voted for in 2024.”
  • “Vote for a candidate who opposes the Trump administration’s immigration policies.”
  • “Vote for a candidate who supports the Trump administration’s immigration policies.”

Headline findings

Immigration is a bigger turnout issue than tariffs – for both sides.

48 percent of Americans say the immigration policies make them more likely to vote in November, including 36 percent much more likely; 9 percent say less likely. On tariffs it was 42 / 7.

43 percent say the policies make no difference, against the 52 percent majority who said that of the tariffs.

46 percent of Republicans say the immigration policies make them more likely to vote, compared to 32 percent on tariffs; 32 percent say much more likely, versus 24 percent on tariffs.

65 percent of Democrats say they are more likely to vote because of Trump’s immigration policies, 54 percent say much more likely. Democrats are more motivated to turn out than Republicans on the Republicans’ own signature issue.

Among 2024 voters: 74 percent of Harris voters are more likely to turn out, 50 percent of Trump voters.

Backing the immigration policies is not the liability that backing tariffs was – but it is not an asset either.

Americans are 34 percent more likely, 41 percent less likely (net −6) to vote for a candidate who supports Trump’s immigration policies. This is a much narrower gap than the net −20 points for supporting Trump’s tariff policies.

Americans are 42 percent more likely, 31 percent less likely (net +11) to vote for a candidate who opposes Trump’s immigration policies – a narrower, though still sizeable gap, compared to the net +24 points for a candidate opposing Trump’s tariff policies.

Republicans reward immigration support 69 to 8.

Republicans are net +61 for a candidate who supports the immigration policies, with 50 percent much more likely and only 22 percent saying no difference. In August, only 49 percent of Republicans rewarded a tariff supporter (net +35).

Republicans punish a candidate who opposes the policies 14 / 64 (net −50); Democrats punish a supporter 11 / 75 (net −64).

Independents are unmoved – and unimpressed.

30 percent of Independents say the immigration policies make them more likely to vote – identical to tariffs (31 percent) – and 15 percent say immigration makes them less likely to vote. 55 percent say the policies make no difference.

Independents punish a candidate who supports the policies 14 / 42 (net −27) and reward one who opposes them 38 / 18 (net +20).

While it mobilizes the Republican base, immigration does not close the enthusiasm gap with Democrats, and it does not win the middle.

Because of the immigration policies… (more likely / less likely)
Measure All adults Republican Democrat Independent
Vote in the November midterms 48 / 9
(net +40)
46 / 6
(net +41)
65 / 8
(net +57)
30 / 15
(net +15)
Vote for a candidate who opposes the immigration policies 42 / 31
(net +11)
14 / 64
(net −50)
78 / 6
(net +72)
38 / 18
(net +20)
Vote for a candidate who supports the immigration policies 34 / 41
(net −6)
69 / 8
(net +61)
11 / 75
(net −64)
14 / 42
(net −27)

Weighted percentages; “more likely” and “less likely” are the combined much/somewhat boxes, and the balance is “no difference.” Party groups use leaned identification.

The voters who actually show up

Over-65s are the group immigration mobilizes most: 62 percent say they are more likely to vote because of Trump’s policies, 55 percent much more likely (against 42 percent much more likely on tariffs).

But over-65s are split on the issue: 45 percent say they are more likely to vote for a candidate that supports Trump’s immigration policies, while another 45 percent say they are less likely to vote for a candidate that supports the policies.

Americans who follow politics most of the time are similarly split 44 / 44 on backing a supporter of Trump’s immigration policies (compared to net −21 on tariffs).

Households earning above $100k a year are similarly split, with a net +1 on backing a candidate that supports Trump’s immigration policies.

Of the consistently high turnout groups, only college graduates fall clearly against a candidate that supports Trump’s immigration policies, net −11 points.

Because of the immigration policies… (more likely / less likely)
Measure All adults 65+ College degree or higher $100k+ family income Follow politics closely
Vote in the November midterms 48 / 9
+40 net
62 / 6
+56 net
56 / 4
+52 net
55 / 4
+52 net
65 / 2
+63 net
Vote for a candidate who opposes the immigration policies 42 / 31
+11 net
41 / 49
−8 net
51 / 26
+25 net
45 / 32
+14 net
51 / 35
+16 net
Vote for a candidate who supports the immigration policies 34 / 41
−6 net
45 / 45
+1 net
35 / 46
−11 net
39 / 39
+1 net
44 / 44
−1 net

“Follow politics closely” = follow what is going on in government and public affairs “most of the time” (40 percent of adults). Weighted percentages; “more / less” combine the much and somewhat boxes. Remainder is “no difference”.

In August there was no high-turnout group in which backing the tariffs won votes, in most cases it lost votes. In September there was no high-turnout group in which backing the immigration policies clearly won votes, either.

Hispanic Americans, women and the young

Hispanic Americans are not the united bloc against the immigration policies that both parties tend to assume: they split 31 / 40 (net −8) on a candidate who supports the policies and 36 / 33 (net +3) on one who opposes them.

Hispanic Americans are among the most mobilized groups in the poll (49 percent more likely to vote), but also among the groups most likely to say the policies make them less likely to vote at all (15 percent).

Men are evenly split on whether they are more or less likely to vote for a candidate that supports Trump’s immigration policies (38 / 37, net +1).

Women punish a candidate that supports Trump’s immigration policies, with 30 percent saying they are more likely to vote for that candidate, against 44 percent who say they are less likely to vote for them (net −14).

And the immigration policies are mobilizing the youngest voters in a way the tariffs did not: 52 percent of under-30s say they are more likely to vote, against 37 percent on tariffs, and they reward a candidate who opposes the policies 51 / 17 (net +34, against +24 on tariffs).

Because of the immigration policies… (more likely / less likely)
Measure All adults Hispanic Women Men Under 30
Vote in the November midterms 48 / 9
+40 net
49 / 15
+34 net
47 / 8
+38 net
50 / 9
+41 net
52 / 7
+45 net
Vote for a candidate who opposes the immigration policies 42 / 31
+11 net
36 / 33
+3 net
44 / 29
+15 net
40 / 33
+7 net
51 / 17
+34 net
Vote for a candidate who supports the immigration policies 34 / 41
−6 net
31 / 40
−8 net
30 / 44
−14 net
38 / 37
+1 net
28 / 37
−9 net

Weighted percentages. Hispanic respondents n = 172 (margin of error about ±9 points); under-30s n = 181 (about ±9 points).

What this means for the midterms

The poll went into the field on 1 September, the week before Republicans gather in Dallas for the party’s first midterm convention. Party officials have told Reuters the two-day event on 9 and 10 September is their best chance to energize Republican voters, whose enthusiasm trails that of Democrats, by refocusing them on tax cuts, immigration policies and securing the southern border. The White House has already made the pitch explicit: last week it launched an online arcade of policy-themed games under the slogan “Build the wall. Deport. Fill a Trump Account.”

The enthusiasm gap is the defining fact of the campaign. Reuters/Ipsos has the President’s approval at 33 percent for the third straight poll, with 46 percent of Democrats “very enthusiastic” about voting in November against 31 percent of Republicans. “Democratic enthusiasm is through the roof, but Republicans haven’t come home yet,” Republican strategist Alex Conant told Bloomberg. Vulnerable Republicans in competitive races are keeping their distance from the Dallas convention.

This poll shows what the Dallas strategy is worth. Immigration is the right issue to bring the Republican base home: it motivates Republicans to vote where the tariffs do not, and it is close to a wash with the country as a whole. But it does not outrun Democratic mobilization, it does not sway Independents or the high-turnout voters, and it splits the senior voters who often decide midterms.

Republicans can fight this election on immigration. On this date, they cannot win it there alone.

Commentary

Quotes attributable to Joe Hockey, President and Founding Partner, Bondi Partners:

“Immigration brings the Republican base off the couch in a way tariffs do not. But it motivates Democrats in even greater numbers and with greater intensity.”

“Seven in ten Republicans reward a candidate who backs the President on immigration, and it costs far less with the wider electorate than tariffs do.”

“Immigration does not clearly win the middle. Across all Americans, a candidate who supports Trump’s immigration policies loses some votes, and Independents punish a candidate who backs the policies by exactly the margin that they punish a candidate who backs his tariffs.”

“Among voters that reliably show up to vote in midterm elections, immigration genuinely splits the vote. Over-65s are split down the middle on it. Rallying the base is necessary in a midterm, but it doesn’t win elections, on its own.”

Quotes attributable to Mick Mulvaney, Senior Adviser to Bondi Partners and former acting Chief of Staff during the first Trump presidency:

“Watch the seniors: they punished tariff support in August and on immigration they split right down the middle. That is the difference between an issue that loses you the election and an issue that lets you fight it.”

“Republican candidates in tight races will read this and change the subject from tariffs to the border every chance they get. The data says that is the right call for the base and a wash with the country as a whole.”

“Elections aren’t won by mobilizing the base, alone. So Republican candidates will also need to have a strong story to tell on cost of living and affordability, which poll after poll tells us is the main thing on people’s minds.”

About the Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse is a monthly polling series measuring American attitudes on issues of public policy that have direct implications for Australia and its relationship with the United States. It is the only poll that regularly tracks American attitudes to the issues that impact the Australia–U.S. relationship.

The U.S. Pulse is commissioned by Bondi Partners, the strategic advisory firm founded by former Australian Treasurer and Ambassador to the United States, Joe Hockey, who served as ambassador during the first Trump presidency.

Methodology

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse is conducted by YouGov. This wave surveyed 1,000 U.S. adults using YouGov’s online panel and was weighted to be nationally representative of the U.S. adult population by age, gender, race, education, and 2024 presidential vote. The overall margin of error is ±3.55 percentage points.

Fieldwork was conducted from 1 to 3 September 2026. The four immigration questions were fielded for the first time this wave, using the same wording as the August tariff questions with the policy named changed; comparisons between the two waves compare responses to two different policies, not a trend on one. The U.S.-Australia Alliance Tracker has been fielded in all seven waves since March 2026. Party groups use leaned party identification.

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