More than four in ten Americans say the Trump administration’s tariffs have made them more likely to vote in November – and the voters being mobilized are overwhelmingly the tariffs’ opponents.

Backing the tariffs is now a net electoral liability: supporting them costs a candidate nearly twice as many votes as it wins, independents punish tariff supporters and reward tariff opponents by identical margins – and almost nobody says the tariffs will make them switch sides.

The latest Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse poll, published in the Australian Financial Review, finds 42 percent of Americans say the tariffs have made them more likely to vote in the November 2026 midterm elections – including 32 percent who say much more likely. Just 7 percent say the tariffs make them less likely to vote; 52 percent say they make no difference.

But the mobilization is heavily one-sided: 61 percent of Democrats say the tariffs make them more likely to vote, against 32 percent of Republicans and 31 percent of independents. Among Americans who voted for Kamala Harris in 2024, 66 percent are more likely to turn out; among Donald Trump’s 2024 voters, 36 percent.

The consequences for candidates are stark:

A candidate who opposes the tariffs gains votes: 47 percent of Americans are more likely to support them, 24 percent less likely – net +23.

A candidate who supports the tariffs loses votes: 24 percent more likely, 44 percent less likely – net −20.

Even among Republicans, only 49 percent say tariff support makes them more likely to back a candidate.

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse – a nationally representative poll delivered by YouGov – asked Americans whether the Trump administration’s tariffs have made them more or less likely to do each of the following ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections, or made no difference:

• “Vote in the November 2026 midterm elections.”
• “Vote for a candidate from a different political party than the presidential candidate you voted for in 2024.”
• “Vote for a candidate who opposes the Trump administration’s tariffs.”
• “Vote for a candidate who supports the Trump administration’s tariffs.”

Headline findings

Tariffs have become a turnout issue.

42 percent of Americans say the tariffs have made them more likely to vote in the November midterm elections – including 32 percent much more likely – against just 7 percent who say less likely.

A 52 percent majority say the tariffs make no difference to whether they vote.

The turnout energy is running one way.

61 percent of Democrats say the tariffs make them more likely to vote, versus 32 percent of Republicans and 31 percent of Independents – and nearly half of Democrats (48 percent) say much more likely.

Among Americans who voted in 2024 the gap is identical:

66 percent of Harris voters are more likely to turn out,

36 percent of Trump voters are more likely to turn out.

The coalition the tariffs anger is roughly twice as mobilized as the coalition they please.

Backing the tariffs costs votes; opposing them wins votes.

A candidate who supports the tariffs makes 24 percent of Americans more likely to vote for them and 44 percent less likely (net −20).

A candidate who opposes the tariffs makes 47 percent of Americans more likely to vote, 24 percent less likely (net +23).

Independents punish support (13/42, net −29) and reward opposition (42/13, net +29) by almost identical margins.

Only the Republican base rewards tariff support – and without a majority.

Republicans are net +35 for a tariff-supporting candidate, but only 49 percent say “more likely.” A signature position of the President again cannot clear half of his own party.

Democrats punish tariff support 8/75 (net −67).

This is mobilization, not persuasion.

Among Americans who voted in 2024, just 16 percent say the tariffs make them more likely to cross party lines in November, while 39 percent say less likely.

The voters most motivated by tariffs to turn out, are the voters opposed to tariffs. But tariffs harden existing loyalties rather than flip them: they will decide who shows up, not necessarily who they vote for.

The voters who actually show up

The voters who turn out in greater numbers in midterm elections are typically older, better educated and more politically engaged than sometimes-voters who only turn out for presidential elections.

Every one of those high-turnout groups is responding to the tariffs the same way.

49 percent of people with a college degree or higher say the tariffs make them more likely to vote, against 32 percent of Americans with high school education or less; 51 percent of Americans who follow politics most of the time say the same, and 46 percent of over-65s.

And on the candidate tests, each of these groups punishes tariff support on net – including seniors, the most tariff-sympathetic high-turnout group in the electorate.

Because of the tariffs… ( more likely / less likely )	All adults	65+	College degree or higher	$100k+ family income	Follow politics closely
Vote in November	42 / 7 +35 net	46 / 6 +40 net	49 / 3 +46 net	49 / 4 +45 net	51 / 3 +48 net
Back a candidate who opposes the tariffs	47 / 24 +23 net	46 / 35 +11 net	58 / 20 +38 net	53 / 27 +26 net	55 / 26 +29 net
Back a candidate who supports the tariffs	24 / 44 -20 net	30 / 48 -18 net	23 / 53 -30 net	30 / 44 -14 net	28 / 49 -21 net

“Follow politics closely” = follow what is going on in government and public affairs “most of the time” (44 percent of adults). Weighted percentages; “more / less” combine the much and somewhat boxes. Remainder is “no difference”.

The tariffs are pulling the most reliable midterm voters off the sidelines – twice as hard on the Democratic side.

• 47 percent of Americans are more likely to back a candidate that opposes tariffs, 24 percent are less likely – net +23.
• 24 percent of Americans are more likely to back a candidate that supports tariffs, 44 percent are less likely – net -20.
• Democrats reward opposition with near-unanimous intensity: 82/4 (net +78), with 62 percent much more likely.
• Republicans reward support 49/14 (net +35) – solid, but with barely under half saying “more likely” and 37 percent saying it makes no difference.
• Independents are key: net +29 for a tariff opponent, net −29 for a tariff supporter – a 58-point swing on a single issue among the voters who decide competitive seats.

There is no high-turnout group in which backing tariffs is a net vote-winner.

What the tariffs are not doing is converting anyone to switch political allegiances.

Among Americans who voted in 2024, 16 percent say the tariffs make them more likely to vote for a different party than they backed in 2024 – while 39 percent say less likely, and 45 percent say no difference. The tariff fight is not creating converts, it is cementing camps. In a turnout election, intensity is the currency.

What this means for the midterms

The poll went into the field on 6 August, in the second week of the administration’s rebuilt tariff wall.

After the Supreme Court struck down the previous emergency-powers tariffs in February, new Section 301 duties of 10 to 12.5 percent took effect on 24 July across some 60 trading partners – covering, by the U.S. Trade Representative’s estimate, 99.4 percent of U.S. imports.

On 3 August, 25 Democratic-led states sued to block the new duties; fieldwork ran with that challenge in the news.

The findings explain the scramble now visible on both sides. Democrats are leaning in: tariff affordability is anchoring their campaigns from Michigan – where a state study puts the tariff cost at US$3,200 per household – to Iowa, where retaliatory agricultural tariffs have put four Republican-held House seats on the target list.

Republicans are caught in a squeeze this data makes explicit: a base that rewards tariff support too strongly to abandon it, but too weakly to run on it – and independents who punish it.

Congress’s US$12 billion in farm aid and the administration’s exemption carve-outs are best read as attempts to blunt an affordability attack that is landing.

Democrats lead the generic congressional ballot by seven points, with control of the Senate resting on toss-up races in Iowa, Ohio, Maine and Alaska.

Commentary

Quotes attributable to Joe Hockey, President and Founding Partner, Bondi Partners:

“Four in ten Americans say the tariffs have made them more likely to vote this November. The problem for the White House is who is getting off the couch: the tariffs are mobilizing their opponents at nearly twice the rate of their supporters.”

“Midterm elections are determined by turnout even more than presidential elections. Each side will be looking for a handful of issues to mobilize their base.”

“Half of campaigning is deciding what the election is about, and the other half is having a credible answer. If Democrats want this election to be about affordability, this data shows that opposing tariffs does both jobs.”

“Next month, our U.S. Pulse will poll voters on a core Republican election issue, to test if it motivates their base with quite the same intensity that opposing tariffs does for Democrats.”

Quotes attributable to Mick Mulvaney, Senior Adviser to Bondi Partners and former acting Chief of Staff during the first Trump presidency:

“Look at who the tariffs are mobilizing: seniors, college graduates, the people who follow politics closely and typically vote in midterms. When those groups say they are motivated to vote – and to vote for someone that opposes tariffs – believe them.”

“There is not one high-turnout group in America where backing these tariffs wins a candidate votes, overall. The last thing the White House wants is for the midterms to become a referendum on tariffs.”

“Republican strategists will advise their candidates to avoid campaigning on tariffs, and focus on the issues that motivate their base, instead. This data suggests we may even see Republicans in tight races distance themselves or even publicly oppose tariffs, if it gets them across the line.”

About the Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse is a monthly polling series measuring American attitudes on issues of public policy that have direct implications for Australia and its relationship with the United States. It is the only poll that regularly tracks American attitudes to the issues that impact the Australia–U.S. relationship.

The U.S. Pulse is commissioned by Bondi Partners, the strategic advisory firm founded by former Australian Treasurer and Ambassador to the United States, Joe Hockey, who served as ambassador during the first Trump presidency.

Methodology

The Bondi Partners U.S. Pulse is conducted by YouGov. This wave surveyed 1,000 U.S. adults using YouGov’s online panel and was weighted to be nationally representative of the U.S. adult population by age, gender, race, education, and 2024 presidential vote. The overall margin of error is ±3.6 percentage points.

Fieldwork was conducted from 6 to 10 August 2026. The four tariff questions were fielded for the first time this wave and form a baseline for future trend measurement; the U.S.-Australia Alliance Tracker has been fielded in all six waves since March 2026. Party groups use leaned party identification. Figures for the party-switching question are re-based on the 60 percent of respondents who voted in 2024, as indicated.

Full results by party – August 2026

August 2026 – more likely / less likely (percent)

Because of the tariffs…	All adults	Republican	Democrat	Independent
Vote in the November midterms	42 / 7	32 / 5	61 / 6	31 / 9
Vote for a candidate who opposes the tariffs	47 / 24	14 / 52	82 / 4	42 / 13
Vote for a candidate who supports the tariffs	24 / 44	49 / 14	8 / 75	13 / 42
Switch party from 2024 vote (2024 voters only)	16 / 39	10 / 44	20 / 39	21 / 20

“More likely” and “less likely” are the combined much/somewhat boxes; the balance is “no difference”. Party groups use leaned party identification. The switching row is re-based on the 60 percent of adults who voted in 2024.